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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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| Nicolo, Antonio; Rodriguez Alvarez, Carmelo. |
| We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of the kidney they may receive. Under feasibility constraints, patients' truthful revelation of reservation values is incompatible with constrained efficiency. In the light of this result, we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption on patients' incentives. Patients choose their revelation strategies as to “protect” themselves from bad outcomes and use a lexicographic refinement of maximin strategies. In this environment, if exchanges are pairwise, then priority rules or rules that maximize a fixed ordering... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Kidney; Matching; Protective Behavior; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C78; D78. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50671 |
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| Kushnir, Alexey. |
| Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker has “typical” commonly known preferences with probability close to one and “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Signaling; Cheaptalk; Matching; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C78; D80; J44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96837 |
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| Birk, Angela. |
| How can long-term unemployment be reduced by policy measures of the government? In this paper a growth-matching-model is developed, in which the unemployment pool consists of heterogeneous unemployed workers, short-term and long-term unemployed, and with an endogenous skill-depreciation of the long-term unemployed emerging as technical progress accelerates. For innovation countries characterized by rapid technical progress we show that through subsidizing vacancy creation which causes a substitution and an income effect long-term unemployment can be reduced. Since the positive substitution effect implied by subsidizing vacancy creation outweighs the negative income effect induced by taxing the household's income, a positive employment effect results... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Long-term unemployment; Growth; Search; Matching; Subsidies; Labor and Human Capital; E24; J41; O41. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26194 |
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| Birk, Angela. |
| How does technical progress affect long-term unemployment? The relationship between long-term unemployment and the rate of growth attributable to technical progress is evaluated in a growth-matching-model with heterogeneous jobless workers and with endogenously determined long-term unemployed resulting from skill-depreciation. For innovation economies characterized by high steady-state levels of capital intensities the model shows that, due to a capitalization effect and a qualification-mismatch effect, increasing technological progress has adverse implications for long-term unemployment. Furthermore, for imitation economies with low steady-state capital intensities increasing technological progress can be either favorable or less favorable for long-term... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Long-term unemployment; Mismatch; Growth; Search; Matching; Labor and Human Capital; E24; J41; O41. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26181 |
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| Becker, Sascha O.; Caliendo, Marco. |
| Based on the conditional independence or unconfoundedness assumption, matching has become a popular approach to estimate average treatment effects. Checking the sensitivity of the estimated results with respect to deviations from this identifying assumption has become an increasingly important topic in the applied evaluation literature. If there are unobserved variables that affect assignment into treatment and the outcome variable simultaneously, a hidden bias might arise to which matching estimators are not robust. We address this problem with the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (Observational Studies, 2nd ed., New York: Springer), where mhbounds lets the researcher determine how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the selection... |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Mhbounds; Matching; Treatment effects; Sensitivity analysis; Unobserved heterogeneity; Rosenbaum bounds; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119255 |
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| Nannicini, Tommaso. |
| This article presents a Stata program (sensatt) that implements the sensitivity analysis for matching estimators proposed by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming). The analysis simulates a potential confounder to assess the robustness of the estimated treatment effects with respect to deviations from the conditional independence assumption. The program uses the commands for propensity-score matching (att* ) developed by Becker and Ichino (Stata Journal 2: 358–377). I give an example by using the National Supported Work demonstration, widely known in the program evaluation literature. |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Sensatt; Sensitivity analysis; Matching; Propensity score; Program evaluation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119280 |
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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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